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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW—HOW IT GOT THERE 
MATTERS: TRAIL SMELTER EVADES CERCLA 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AERIAL DEPOSITION OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTE 
Ryan K. Sullivan* 
The Trail Smelter, operated by Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., is an 
integrated smelting and refining complex in Trail, British Columbia.  
It is situated approximately ten miles north of the United States-
Canadian border.  In the early 1900s, the smelter was at the center of 
an international lawsuit that led to a landmark decision of 
international environmental law.  Now, almost a century later, the 
smelter, still in operation, is responsible for widespread 
contamination on tribal lands located within Washington State.  Once 
again, the smelter is embroiled in a protracted legal battle, this time 
facing liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 
While Teck Cominco, which operates the Trail Smelter, suffered 
several defeats throughout the legal proceedings, it recently scored a 
significant victory.  In 2016, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the 
smelter operator, holding that emissions of hazardous waste do not 
constitute “disposal” for the purposes of CERCLA liability.  This 
Note will argue that despite the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that it was 
bound by prior precedent, there were important factual differences 
that distinguished the Pakootas case from the preceding case law.  
Furthermore, the decision in Pakootas is incongruous with CERCLA’s 
legislative history and administrative enforcement.  This Note will 
argue that a definition of disposal that includes the aerial deposition 
of hazardous waste is consistent with CERCLA’s statutory language 
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and conducive to its broad, remedial purpose. 
INTRODUCTION 
Streaming out of Canada, the Columbia River makes its course into 
the northeast corner of Washington State.1  The Upper Columbia River is 
renowned for its fishing, particularly salmon, which make a yearly 
anadromous journey upstream from the Pacific.2  This region is home to 
the Colville Indian Reservation (established in 1872 by the federal 
government),3 but, “since time immemorial,” indigenous tribes have 
traditionally resided in this region and have relied on subsistence fishing 
and hunting.4  The Columbia River forms an important cultural nexus 
between the various tribes confederated under the Colville name 
(Tribes).5 
In the 1980s, concerns began to grow over the declining water 
quality in the Columbia River.  Environmental studies of the Columbia 
River, its tributaries, and nearby Lake Roosevelt reported elevated 
concentrations of arsenic, cadmium, lead, and zinc.6  Later, in 1992, the 
 
1.  Marion E. Marts, Columbia River, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Columbia-River [https://perma.cc/RW79-GY68].  
Prehistoric lava flows and glacial migration carved the Columbia River’s course.  Id.  In 
northern Washington, these geological processes created a topography marked by steeped-
walled ravines.  Id.  The largest of these ravines is Grand Coulee.  Id. 
2.  Id.  The area is also a popular tourism locale, which recently became an increasing 
source of revenue for the tribal economy.  Rich Landers, Fishing the Colville Indian 
Reservation: More Fish, Less Competition, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (May 11, 2014), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2014/may/11/fishing-the-colville-indian-reservation-more-
fish/#/0 [https://perma.cc/XHN9-4HLG]. 
3.  Letter from Richard A. Du Bey, Special Envtl. Counsel to the Confederated Tribes 
of the Colville Reservation, to Reg’l Adm’r U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Aug. 5, 1999) (on file 
with EPA). 
4.  Id.  The Tribes also derive considerable revenue from three casinos located on their 
reservation.  Treva Lind, Colvilles Get Back in Black, J. BUS. SPOKANE (July 14, 2011), 
https://www.spokanejournal.com/local-news/colvilles-get-back-in-black/.  In 2010, Joe 
Pakootas (the named plaintiff in the case that is the subject of this Note) was appointed CEO 
of the company that manages these tribal casinos.  Id. 
5.  See Susan Staiger Gooding, Place, Race, and Names: Layered Identities in United 
States v. Oregon, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Plaintiff-Intervenor, 28 L. 
& SOC’Y REV. 1181, 1206–12 (1994).  The Colville Reservation is comprised of eleven 
different indigenous groups, each with their own distinct language and culture.  Id. at 1206.  
These tribes share a unique historical relationship with the region and the Columbia River, 
gathering for an annual fishing ceremony during the yearly salmon runs.  Id. 
6.  See A. Johnson et al., Transboundary Metal Pollution of the Columbia River 
(Franklin D. Roosevelt Lake), 45 BULL. ENVTL. CONTAMINATION & TOXICOLOGY 703, 706 
(1990).  The concentrations of zinc, copper, and mercury were two orders of magnitude higher 
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U.S. Geological Survey found dioxins and furans in the Columbia 
River’s sediment.7  In 1994, mercury concentrations found in sportfish 
required Washington’s Department of Health to issue a consumption 
advisory to the public.8 
The source of the contamination was all too familiar to residents in 
the region.9  A Canadian smelter, located just a few miles north of the 
border, stands starkly against the surrounding bucolic valley.10  The 
smelter is among the largest employers in Trail, British Columbia, and 
provides vital economic support for the area; it also happens to boast an 
infamous environmental résumé.11  At the turn of the twentieth century, 
the smelter’s fumes led to an international environmental lawsuit 
between the United States and Canada.12  Ultimately, the smelter 
company was found responsible for transboundary pollution, but 
succeeded in paying little compensation for its widespread 
environmental harm.13 
The same smelter—which a century earlier strangled crops and 
livestock throughout the region—was now responsible for extensive 
pollution within the Colville Reservation.14  The Tribes petitioned the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to investigate and determine 
 
Columbia River Basin and provides irrigation for much of the surrounding agriculture.  Marts, 
supra note 1. 
7.  Du Bey, supra note 3, at para. 4.5. 
8.  Id. at para. 4.2.  Along with mercury, the results demonstrated that fish were 
consuming significant amounts of lead, cadmium, zinc, and other trace substances during their 
annual spawning migrations.  M. D. MUNN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF INTERIOR, U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CONCENTRATIONS OF MERCURY AND OTHER TRACE ELEMENTS IN 
WALLEYE, SMALLMOUTH BASS, AND RAINBOW TROUT IN FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LAKE 
AND THE UPPER COLUMBIA RIVER, WASHINGTON, 1994 21 tbl.10 (1995), 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1995/0195/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MGC-P854]. 
9.  See Johnson et al., supra note 6.  “The high metals concentrations in Lake Roosevelt 
sediments are thought to be primarily due to discharges from the Cominco Limited lead-zinc 
smelter and refinery at Trail, BC, approximately ten miles above the international border.”  Id. 
at 708. 
10.  See George A. Shipman, The Columbia River Basin, 15 W. POL. Q. 34, 34–36 
(Sept. 1962). 
11.  See generally Trail Operations, TECK, https://www.teck.com/operations/canada/
operations/trail-operations-5672/ [https://perma.cc/SCM7-NVGK]; see also John D. Wirth, 
The Trail Smelter Dispute: Canadians and Americans Confront Transboundary Pollution, 
1927–41, 1 ENVTL. HIST. 34 (1996). 
12.  Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1908, 1917–19 (Apr. 1938), 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JHB-SSVA]. 
13.  Id. at 1931. 
14.  See Toby Kruger, Trail Smelter II: A Prudent Approach? From Extraterritoriality 
to Non-Discrimination, 43 U.B.C. L. REV. 109, 109–10 (2010) (“The amount of pollution 
released by the smelter is, by all accounts, staggering.”). 
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the extent of the contamination.15  The results were alarming to say the 
least.16  The site was quickly placed on the National Priorities List 
(NPL), which is comprised of contaminated locations in need of 
emergency environmental remediation.17  The EPA also verified that the 
Trail Smelter was the primary source of the hazardous waste 
contaminating the Columbia River and, thus, responsible for the cleanup 
costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).18 
The operator of the Trail Smelter is Teck Cominco, a Canadian 
company.19  Teck argued that it was not responsible for the cleanup costs 
because, as a foreign corporation, it was not subject to the provisions of 
CERCLA.20  Teck Cominco did not deny, however, that it had been 
dumping hazardous waste into the Columbia River for almost a 
century.21  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was not receptive to Teck 
Cominco’s jurisdictional defense.22  The court found CERCLA could be 
enforced against the company because the “release” of the hazardous 
waste occurred within the domestic border of the United States.23 
Along with dumping toxic metals into the Columbia River, Teck 
Cominco was allegedly contaminating the area through aerial deposition 
of particulate matter.24  The Tribes claimed that the smelter’s emissions 
contained small particles of hazardous waste (e.g., mercury, lead, 
cadmium, etc.); these particles are carried by wind currents and 
 
15.  Letter from Colleen Cawston, Chair, Colville Bus. Council, to Reg’l Adm’r U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency (July 30, 1999) (on file with EPA); Du Bey, supra note 3. 
16.  Upper Columbia River Site, No. CERCLA-10-2004-0018, at 2–3 (EPA Dec. 11, 
2003), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/10/1167995.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALZ4-WTTY]. 
17.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2012). 
18.  Upper Columbia River Site, CERCLA-10-2004-0018 at 3–6. 
19.  See Trail Operations, supra note 11.  The Trail Smelter has changed hands a 
number of times during its operation: first it was owned by “Consolidated Mining and 
Smelting Company of Canada Limited (CM&S), later Cominco Ltd., and now Teck Cominco 
Metals Ltd., a subsidiary of Teck Cominco Limited.”  Richard Fish, Trail Operations at 100, 
CANADIAN MINING J. (June 1, 2006), http://www.canadianminingjournal.com/features/trail-
operations-at-100/ [https://perma.cc/4VHF-P7RM]. 
20.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006). 
21.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 979 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(“Teck stipulated that it had dumped slag into the Columbia River in Canada, that some of the 
slag came to be located in the United States, where it has leached and continues to leach 
hazardous substances into the water and sediment of the Columbia River and Lake 
Roosevelt . . . .”). 
22.  Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1079. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 979. 
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deposited throughout the Colville Reservation.25  Over time, this 
continuous process results in high levels of soil contamination that 
present serious long-term consequences for the environment.26 
Teck Cominco challenged the legal sufficiency of the Tribes’ claim.  
It argued that the aerial deposition of particulate matter did not constitute 
“disposal” for the purposes of CERCLA.27  The issue was litigated 
extensively and, ultimately, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Teck Cominco 
that aerial deposition of hazardous waste is not a form of disposal under 
CERCLA.28  Accordingly, Teck Cominco was not legally responsible for 
the particulate matter contamination located on the Colville 
Reservation.29  While the Tribes could still proceed with their other 
claims against the company, this ruling dramatically curtailed the scope 
of potential CERCLA liability in the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction.30 
First, this Note will explore the history of the Trail Smelter, and the 
contamination that it has caused in Washington State.  Next, it will 
discuss the modern legal issues presented by the Trail Smelter’s 
contamination of the Colville Reservation.  To fully understand the 
context of these legal issues, this Note will examine the history and 
purpose of CERCLA, which is at the heart of the Pakootas case.  Then, 
this Note will explain the basis of the Pakootas court’s ruling, and will 
argue that the decision was incorrect on several grounds. 
As will be explained in the Analysis section of this Note, the court 
failed to consider the factual context of the cases that were viewed as 
binding and persuasive precedent.  Further, the legislative history and 
administrative enforcement of CERCLA supports the conclusion that the 
aerial deposition of hazardous waste is a form of disposal.  Accordingly, 
the Pakootas court should have found that Teck Cominco was legally 
 
25.  Id. 
26.  In one scientific study, researchers found that contaminated soil caused plants to 
grow slower, produce lower yields, and experience elevated toxicity symptoms like chlorosis 
and necrosis.  Michael Komárek et al., Bioavailability of Lead and Cadmium in Soils 
Artificially Contaminated with Smelter Fly Ash, 83 BULL. ENVTL. CONTAMINATION & 
TOXICOLOGY 286, 287–89 (2009). 
27.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 980. 
28.  Id. at 986. 
29.  See id. 
30.  See id.; Environmental Law—Particulate Matter Emissions—Ninth Circuit Holds 
That the Emission of Pollutants from Rail Yards Is Not “Disposal” of Solid Waste Under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.—Center for Community Action & Environmental 
Justice v. BNSF Railway Co., 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1275 
(2015) [hereinafter Particulate Matter Emissions] (“[I]f applied strictly, [this ruling] may 
exempt from citizen suits some disposals of solid substances through the air . . . even though 
they contribute to hazardous waste contamination of land or water.”). 
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responsible for the emitted waste that subsequently contaminated the 
Colville Reservation. 
I. HISTORY OF THE TRAIL SMELTER AND ITS LEGAL BATTLE 
WITH THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE 
RESERVATION 
This section examines the history of the Trail Smelter dating back to 
its original construction at the turn of the twentieth century and its 
involvement in a legal battle between the United States and Canada.  
Next, this section traces the facts that led to the recent Ninth Circuit 
decision and discusses the legal arguments that were presented by both 
sides.  Lastly, this section provides a brief synopsis of CERCLA, 
including its purpose and application, and how the law differs from 
similar remedial statutes. 
A. How It All Started: Smoke from the North 
When silver ore was discovered in British Columbia in 1889, “[t]he 
nearest smelter was . . . 500 miles away in Montana.”31  Noticing a 
business opportunity, an engineer named E.S. Topping purchased a 
silver mine and constructed a smelter in Trail, British Columbia.32  The 
operations at Trail quickly expanded, and in 1906 the Consolidated 
Mining and Smelting Company of Canada, Limited (Consolidated) 
acquired the facility.33  Although the silver mines eventually stopped 
production in the 1920s, zinc and lead ore discovered in the neighboring 
 
31.  Keith A. Murray, The Trail Smelter Case: International Air Pollution in the 
Columbia Valley, 15 BC STUD. 68, 68 (1972).  Smelting is “to melt or fuse (as ore)” in order 
to change the chemical composition of the material and separate the metal.  Smelt, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).  Ironically, the nearest smelter was in 
the unincorporated community of Black Eagle, which is now a recognized superfund site 
itself.  Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Proposes Adding Anaconda Copper Mining 
Co. Smelter and Refinery to Superfund Site List (Mar. 4, 2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/documents/PressRelease4Mar2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCY6-LT4M].  In 
fact, the contamination and CERCLA enforcement action taken against the Black Eagle 
smelter was cited in the Pakootas plaintiffs’ Rule 28(j) letter to the Ninth Circuit.  See infra 
Subpart II.C. 
32.  Murray, supra note 31, at 69. 
33.  Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1908, 1917–19 (Apr. 1938), 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JHB-SSVA].  The 
Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada, Ltd. had recently received its charter 
from the Canadian government.  Id. at 1917.  Shortly thereafter, the corporation sold half of its 
stock to the Canadian Pacific Railway, which immediately began construction of a spur line to 
Trail.  Murray, supra note 31, at 70. 
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town of Kimberly intensified the operation at Trail.34  In 1925 and 1927, 
two smoke stacks were erected at the Trail Smelter (both standing at 409 
feet in height).35  The stacks were designed to disperse the smelter fumes 
away from Trail, but neighboring mountains funneled the fumes south 
toward the United States.36 
Farmers in Stevens County, Washington, watched “[t]heir crops 
wither[] and their cattle sicken[]” amidst the miasma.37  Desperate, they 
sought any relief available.  While some farmers entered into settlements 
with Consolidated, others banded together and petitioned the local and 
federal governments for assistance.38  After diplomatic discussion, the 
United States and Canada agreed to have the International Joint 
Commission (IJC) review the matter.39  The IJC’s official report 
concluded that Consolidated was responsible for the environmental 
issues in Stevens County, but only awarded $350,000 in total damages.40  
Neither the United States nor Canada found this figure acceptable.41  The 
case remained mired in international politics for several years until, in 
1935, both countries signed the Ottawa Convention, thereby creating a 
special tribunal to arbitrate the issue.42  
 
34.  Murray, supra note 31, at 71–72. 
35.  Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A at 1917.  The design of the stacks evidences an 
intention to disperse hazardous waste over great distances.  Infra Section II.A.2. 
36.  Murray, supra note 31, at 72–73; Wirth, supra note 11, at 35 (“Prevailing air 
currents caused a marked increase in diurnal downdrafts, which scorched crops, accelerated 
forest loss, and filled the Columbia River Valley below with choking, noxious fumes.”). 
37.  Murray, supra note 31, at 73. 
38.  Wirth, supra note 11, at 35.  At the time, the Washington Constitution prohibited 
any foreign person from holding interest in land; this prevented the Trail Smelter from 
purchasing “smoke easements,” in an effort to settle claims with the local farmers.  Id. at 35.  
The farmers in Stevens County could not bring their claims in Canadian courts because 
trespass on foreign land was non-justiciable in the common law courts.  See British S. Afr. Co. 
v. Companhia De Moçambique [1893] AC 602 (Eng. & Wales), 604, http://www.uniset.ca/
other/cs6/1893AC602.html.  “Hence it was because of this domestic legal limitation 
that . . . pollution by a private company affecting individuals was elevated to an international 
dispute.”  TIM STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 127 
(2009). 
39.  Murray, supra note 31, at 75.  The IJC was created in 1909 through the Boundary 
Waters Treaty between the United States and Canada, which was drafted to address all issues 
“involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to the 
inhabitants of the other, along their common frontier, and to make provision for the 
adjustment and settlement of all such questions as may hereafter arise.”  Treaty Between the 
United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters between the United States and 
Canada, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. 548. 
40.  Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1918–19. 
41.  See id.; Murray, supra note 31, at 76–77.  The claimants had sought more than 
three times the awarded sum.  Murray, supra note 31, at 76–77. 
42.  Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1907. 
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The tribunal ultimately ruled in favor of the farmers, but again the 
total damages awarded were small.43  Conversely, Consolidated escaped 
with its business and reputation unscathed.44  In fact, based on evidence 
it presented during the proceedings, Consolidated was commended for 
implementing a progressive mitigation strategy at Trail.45  However, the 
tribunal did issue a valuable precedent that cautioned states against 
permitting unbridled pollution within their borders.46  While this 
decision was not revolutionary, it did underscore a fundamental ideology 
that is now codified in many environmental regulatory models.47 
 
43.  Id. at 1931 (awarding the United States $78,000).  The United States advocated that 
while there was a conspicuous lack of visible destruction directly attributable to the smelter 
fumes, research revealed bioaccumulation in plants, “which in some cases results in 
destruction.”  Wirth, supra note 11, at 44.  The tribunal was not receptive to this “invisible 
injury” theory and consequently awarded damages only for the harm that was evidently 
quantifiable.  Id. at 45.  But see William K. Stevens, The Forest That Stopped Growing: Trail 
is Traced to Acid Rain, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/16/
science/the-forest-that-stopped-growing-trail-is-traced-to-acid-rain.html (finding that sulfur 
dioxide emitted from power plants leaches nutrients away from the soil and dramatically 
affects the growth rates of neighboring forests). 
44.  Wirth, supra note 11, at 37.  In fact, the tribunal did not consider the impact on the 
environment itself; this is perhaps most indicative of the “limited environmental 
consciousness of the time,” which could only quantify damages in terms of real economic 
loss.  STEPHENS, supra note 38, at 135. 
45.  Wirth, supra note 11, at 37.  In the years following the decision, Consolidated 
claimed that it removed more sulfur dioxide from its emissions than all other smelters in North 
America combined.  Murray, supra note 31, at 84. 
46.  Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965. 
The Tribunal, therefore, finds that the above decisions, taken as a whole, constitute 
an adequate basis for its conclusions, namely, that, under the principles of 
international law, as well as of the law of the United States, no State has the right 
to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by 
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when 
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Id.; see also Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907) (finding that it was 
reasonable for a state to enjoin a foreign business for transboundary pollution).  The facts 
underlying Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. were quite similar to the issues confronted in 
Washington.  See Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 238.  The Ducktown Basin in Georgia was 
located between a series of Appalachian Mountains, the topographic dynamics caused smoke 
from the Tennessee copper smelter to stagnate over the town “in a highly concentrated state, 
causing damage too severe and too pervasive for Georgia authorities to ignore.”  DUNCAN 
MAYSILLES, DUCKTOWN SMOKE: THE FIGHT OVER ONE OF THE SOUTH’S GREATEST 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS 102 (2011). 
47.  See JAMES BARROS & DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
POLLUTION 75 (1974).  Some argue that the Trail Smelter case advocates for strict liability 
against the polluter (a key concept within CERCLA, see infra Subpart I.C), while others 
contend it only invokes the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (“use your 
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another”).  Id.  Regardless of this academic  
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B. The Modern Trail Smelter Dilemma 
Over the next several decades, the owners of the Trail Smelter 
expanded their operations.  Soon, it was among the largest lead-zinc 
smelters in the world.48  But, this rapid expansion was not without 
environmental consequences.49  In 1999, the Tribes living on sovereign 
territory in Washington state petitioned the EPA to conduct a 
preliminary assessment of their land.50  The Tribes were concerned that 
the neighboring Trail Smelter was, once again, contaminating the 
region.51  The EPA’s preliminary study found heavy metals, including 
“arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, mercury and zinc,” in addition to slag 
(a known smelting byproduct) throughout the assessment zone.52  The 
EPA concluded that the site was eligible for the NPL and ordered Teck 
Cominco, the current owner of the Trail Smelter, to conduct a Remedial 
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS).53 
 
debate, the decision’s principles were incorporated into the Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment: a landmark document that recognized the intrinsic need for more 
international environmental regulation.  See id. at 299–303; see also Martijn van de Kerkhof, 
The Trail Smelter Case Re-examined: Examining the Development of National Procedural 
Mechanisms to Resolve a Trail Smelter Type Dispute, 27 MERKOURIOS-UTRECHT J. INT’L & 
EUR. L. 68, 74 (2011); cf. CAROLYN ABBOT, ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL 
REGULATION, STRENGTHENING SANCTION AND IMPROVING DETERRENCE 43 (2009) (noting 
that strict legal consequences can bring about dramatic changes in “corporate policy and 
management”). 
48.  See Trail Operations, supra note 11. 
49.  See generally Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 
2006); see also Upper Columbia River Site, No. CERCLA-10-2004-0018, (EPA Dec. 11, 
2003), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/10/1167995.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALZ4-WTTY]. 
50.  See Cawston, supra note 15; Du Bey, supra note 3.  The petition stated that the 
Upper Columbia River Basin was of “central importance to the Colville Tribes’ subsistence 
and culture.”  Du Bey, supra note 3, at para. 2.  Evidence of water and soil contamination, 
along with bioaccumulation in wildlife, presented a discernable risk to the health and well-
being of local residents and tourists.  See Cawston, supra note 15. 
51.  See Cawston, supra note 15; see also Du Bey, supra note 3. 
52.  Upper Columbia River Site, CERCLA-10-2004-0018 at 2 para. 4.  Carcinogenic 
contaminants in the soil and groundwater of an assessment site typically result in a high score 
on the Hazard Ranking System (HRS) index, which is a “quick-and-dirty estimate of the 
potential for exposure to hazardous substances.”  Shreekant Gupta et al., Do Benefits and 
Costs Matter in Environmental Regulation? An Analysis of EPA Decisions Under Superfund, 
in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 91 (Richard L. Revesz & 
Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995). 
53.  Upper Columbia River Site, CERCLA-10-2004-0018 at 9 para. 4.  The NPL is 
comprised of sites with the highest HRS scores; these sites are eligible for long-term remedial 
action from the CERCLA trust fund.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(g)(2) (2016).  The RI/FS is a vital 
stage in the cleanup process; it is a detailed study that outlines a site’s overall risk to the 
community and presents a plan for remediation.  See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (2011); James T. 
Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Magnitude and Policy Implications of Health Risk from  
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Teck Cominco never fulfilled its obligation to perform the RI/FS, 
nor did the EPA attempt to enforce its order.54  The matter might have 
ended there but the Tribes brought a private action against Teck 
Cominco under 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1).55  The Tribes’ complaint was 
predicated on the EPA’s preliminary findings, alleging that Teck 
Cominco was responsible for cleanup costs at the Upper Columbia River 
(UCR) site based on CERCLA “arranger” liability.56 
Originally, the Pakootas case focused only on Teck Cominco’s 
disposal of hazardous waste directly into the Columbia River.57  During 
the proceedings, however, the Tribes amended their complaint to include 
allegations that the smelter’s emissions had caused contamination at the 
UCR site.58  In response, Teck Cominco filed a motion to strike, arguing 
that “CERCLA imposes no liability when hazardous substances travel 
through the air and then ‘into or on any land or water.’”59  The district 
court denied the defendant’s motions to strike and to reconsider, but the 
matter was certified for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
 
Hazardous Waste Sites, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 91 
(Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995). 
54.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). 
55.  Id.  The Tribes also sought “penalties for [Teck Cominco’s] noncompliance and 
recovery for costs and fees.”  Id.  Section 9659(a)(1) permits a private action to enforce an 
administrative order.  42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (2016).  At the time the action was initiated, 
Joseph Pakootas was the CEO of the Confederate Tribes of the Colville Reservation; he ran 
for Congress as a Democrat in 2016.  See generally Pakootas for Congress, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/pakootasforcongress/ [https://perma.cc/R2N4-GF2S]. 
56.  Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 
975 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. CV-04-256), at 10 para. 8.5; see infra Subpart II.C.  There are four 
ways that a party can be liable under CERCLA, one of which is as an “arranger.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(3) (2016).  Under this classification, if a party arranges for the disposal of 
hazardous waste, it can be liable for any damage caused by the arranged disposal.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(3) (2016); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 
(2008).  See generally Daniel J. DePasquale, Note, Environmental Law—CERCLA 
Enforcement: Terminology and Meaning of “Treatment” Arranger Liability, 38 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 425 (2016) (analyzing CERCLA arranger liability for contamination caused by 
“treatment” of a hazardous waste).  Arrangement is a nebulous concept that has been analyzed 
in numerous cases, and a full discussion of arranger liability exceeds the narrow scope of this 
Note. 
57.  See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1069–70.  Teck Cominco eventually admitted that 
between 1906 and 1995, it annually dumped more than 145,000 tons of industrial waste 
directly into the Columbia River.  Id. at 1069–70.  The river pathway claims have proceeded 
separately from the claims alleging aerial deposition of hazardous waste.  Pakootas v. Teck 
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016). 
58.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 979. 
59.  Id. at 980. 
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Appeals.60  The Ninth Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling.61 
The court of appeals’ decision was based on two prior cases that 
specifically addressed the term “disposal” for the purposes of 
environmental liability.62  The first, and perhaps more influential case, 
Center for Community Action & Environmental Justice v. BNSF 
Railyard Co., was a 2014 opinion regarding diesel emissions at rail 
yards.63  This case introduced a controversial “order-of-disposal” rule 
that seemingly required hazardous waste to first be physically placed on 
the ground before any emissions thereof could constitute disposal.64  The 
Pakootas ruling was also guided by a prior en banc opinion, Carson 
Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., that addressed the scope of 
CERCLA liability when applied to the passive migration of 
contaminates through soil and other media.65 
Together these two cases (BNSF and Carson Harbor) form the vital 
legal basis for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pakootas.66  But, in 
reaching its decision, the court ignored factual and legal issues that 
distinguished the Pakootas claim from those presented in the case law.  
As this Note will argue, this error led to a decision that is incongruous 
with CERCLA’s purpose, legislative history, and prior administrative 
application. 
C. CERCLA’s Origins and Legislative History 
To understand the Ninth Circuit’s decision, it is necessary to 
understand CERCLA liability.  CERCLA was enacted in response to a 
community health crisis in Niagara Falls, New York, that garnered 
national media attention and collective public outcry.67  But, as 
 
60.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, 
at *4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014), rev’d, 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). 
61.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 986. 
62.  See id. at 983–84. 
63.  See generally Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 
1019 (9th Cir. 2014).  It should be noted that BNSF involved the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) and not CERCLA, but disposal has the same meaning under both laws.  
Id. at 1020; see 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2016). 
64.  See Particulate Matter Emissions, supra note 30, at 1274–75. 
65.  See generally Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 
2001) (en banc). 
66.  See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 983–84. 
67.  ROGER C. HERDMAN ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH, LOVE CANAL: PUBLIC HEALTH 
TIME BOMB 3 (Sept. 1978), https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/investigations/
love_canal/lctimbmb.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP7B-YMT6].  Over a thirty-year period, 
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lawmakers investigated the issue, they discovered the problems 
confronted in Niagara Falls were also occurring throughout the United 
States.68  Congress wanted a law that would enable the government to 
respond swiftly to locations in need of dire assistance and pass the 
cleanup costs onto the responsible party.69 
Unfortunately, when it came to drafting CERCLA, political conflict 
hampered the legislative process.70  The bill that would eventually 
become CERCLA was originally introduced in the House as the 
“Hazardous Waste Containment Act” and was designed to address “oil 
or other pollution of navigable waters.”71  Contemporaneously, Senator 
Edmund Muskie (D-ME) introduced Senate bill 1480, which contained 
many provisions that are fundamental to CERCLA today.72  However, 
both bills encountered difficulties in their respective legislative bodies.73  
Concerned that a change in the political balance of Congress might 
doom the endeavor entirely, a compromise bill was introduced in the 
Senate and rushed through the House during a lame-duck session in 
1980.74  Unsurprisingly, the final draft was written haphazardly and 
many key provisions were defined by cross-reference to existing laws.75  
 
was covered with earth.”  Id.  Ignorant to the danger below, a school and neighborhood were 
built on the vacant land.  Id.  In the 1970s, residents noticed strange odor emanating through 
their basement floors.  Id.  Later identified as toxic chemicals, these substances were found to 
cause serious harm, including miscarriages, birth defects, and liver damage.  Id. at 12. 
68.  S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 7–8 (1980) (the report documents instances that preceded 
the Love Canal incident, including cases of widespread contamination in Michigan, Virginia, 
and elsewhere in New York).  “Not only are water supplies being contaminated, but untold 
numbers of innocent persons are exposed to extremely toxic and hazardous chemicals.  Some 
places, such as Love Canal, have become environmental ghettos.”  Id. at 10. 
69.  126 CONG. REC. 26,334, 26,339 (Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep. Staggers) 
(“Existing law . . . does not authorize cleanup action or provide for an assured source of 
funding for such action if persons responsible for the hazard cannot be located, are insolvent, 
or refuse to take remedial action.”). 
70.  A full examination of CERCLA’s legislative history exceeds the scope of this Note.  
For a more detailed discussion, see generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 
1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). 
71.  Id. at 4.  Pursuant to the “[United States] Constitution, bills that establish taxes or 
address revenue” must have their origins in the House.  CAROLYN STERN SWITZER & PETER 
GRAY, CERCLA: COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND 
LIABILITY ACT (SUPERFUND) 8 (2d ed. 2002). 
72.  See Grad, supra note 70, at 6–8.  In particular, the law enabled the government to 
take quick action on contaminated sites and recover the costs later.  Id. at 8. 
73.  ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE 1–8 (2006 
ed.). 
74.  See id. 
75.  SWITZER & GRAY, supra note 71, at 5–8. 
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This method of defining by cross-reference to another law is not 
uncommon, but occasionally presents problems during future statutory 
interpretation—as this Note will soon explore.76 
1. Liability Under CERCLA and the Definition of “Disposal” 
There are four ways that a party can be liable for cleanup costs 
under CERCLA.  For the purposes of this Note, the focus will be on 
§ 9607(a)(3): 
[A]ny person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for 
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for 
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by 
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or 
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and 
containing such hazardous substances.77 
Based on this statutory language, if a party has arranged for the 
disposal of a hazardous substance, it can be potentially liable under 
CERCLA for any harm caused by the arranged disposal.78 
CERCLA does not define “disposal” for its own purposes.79  Rather, 
the term is defined according to § 6903 of the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA).80  RCRA was enacted two years before 
CERCLA.81  Whereas CERCLA is a remediation statute that is 
“designed to impose liability for past conduct with present effects,”82 
RCRA is intended “to reduce the generation of hazardous waste and to 
ensure the proper treatment, storage, and disposal of [that] waste which 
is nonetheless generated.”83  Based on RCRA and CERCLA’s divergent 
 
76.  Infra Subpart II.C. 
77.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2016). 
78.  Id.  See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 
602 (2009).  Prior to Santa Fe Railway, the Ninth Circuit found Teck Cominco to be an 
“arranger,” even though it did not contract with a third-party to dispose of its hazardous waste.  
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006).  “We hesitate to 
endorse a statutory interpretation that would leave a gaping and illogical hole in the statute’s 
coverage, permitting argument that generators of hazardous waste might freely dispose of it 
themselves and stay outside the statute’s cleanup liability provisions.”  Id. 
79.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(v)(29) (2016). 
80.  Id. 
81.  JOHN S. APPLEGATE & JAN G. LAITOS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: RCRA, CERCLA, 
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 129 (2006). 
82.  Id.  RCRA is a regulatory statute that adopts a “cradle-to-grave” strategy for 
controlling the production and, ultimately, disposal of hazardous waste.  Id. at 18–19. 
83.  Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996).  Pursuant to RCRA, a 
hazardous waste must be a “solid waste.”  42 U.S.C. § 6901(a) (2016). 
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goals, the definition of disposal should not be applied uniformly to the 
separate statutes.84  Nevertheless, interpretations of disposal for the 
purposes of RCRA are considered influential in CERCLA cases.85 
Section 6903 defines disposal as “the discharge, deposit, injection, 
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous 
waste into or on any land or water.”86  While this definition is relatively 
self-explanatory, not all conduct fits neatly within the provided terms.87  
Consequently, as was the case in Pakootas, courts are often tasked with 
parsing the statutory language for answers.88  Naturally, this form of 
judicial inquiry is ripe for controversy, regardless of the outcome.89 
D. The Pakootas Court’s Interpretation of Disposal 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Pakootas (2016) is remarkably short 
considering the vast implications of the decision.  The court essentially 
defers to the legal analysis provided in two Ninth Circuit opinions: 
BNSF90 and Carson Harbor.91  While these cases were certainly relevant 
to deciding the merits of the Pakootas claim, they were not necessarily 
dispositive.92  Nevertheless, the court seemingly declared Pakootas dead 
on arrival, without ever checking for a pulse. 
1.  BNSF’s Holding and Its Relevance to Pakootas 
In BNSF, the plaintiffs brought suit under RCRA, claiming that 
diesel particulate matter (DPM) emitted from rail yards presented “an 
imminent and substantial endangerment” to citizens throughout 
 
84.  See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL 
7408399, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014), rev’d, 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). 
85.  See Pakootas, 830 F.3d, at 983–86. 
86.  42 U.S.C. § 6903 (2016). 
87.  See, e.g., ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(finding that the passive migration of chemicals, which a prior landowner spilled, did not 
constitute disposal under CERCLA or RCRA). 
88.  See, e.g., Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 876–87 (9th Cir. 
2001) (en banc). 
89.  See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 73, at 580 (“[T]hough the liability scheme is strict, 
[Potentially Responsible Parties] are left with plenty of room to argue that some aspect of their 
activities related to the sites . . . do not fit within the defined categories, and thus that they are 
not liable under the statute.”). 
90.  Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th 
Cir. 2014). 
91.  Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 876–87. 
92.  See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1021 (analyzing the definition of disposal for the purposes 
of RCRA); see also Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 876–87 (holding that disposal does not 
include the passive migration of contaminates under CERCLA). 
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California.93  The complaint was brought by a group of local 
environmental advocates who argued that over 1.8 million residents in 
the San Bernardino valley faced an increased risk of cancer due to the 
rail yard emissions.94  Invoking RCRA, the plaintiffs argued that DPM 
was released from idling locomotives and dispersed throughout the 
surrounding environment.95  Thereafter, the DPM was swept up and “re-
entrained into the air by wind, air currents and passing vehicles,” and 
inhaled.96 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case on appeal.  The court found 
that the plaintiffs’ case was not cognizable under RCRA because the 
DPM was emitted prior to its contact with the ground.97  The court’s 
decision was based on its analysis of the terms that comprise the 
definition of “disposal.”98  The court found it particularly informative 
that the definition of “release”99 for the purpose of RCRA included the 
term “emitting,” whereas the definition of “disposal” did not.100  The 
court interpreted this omission as evidence that Congress must have 
intended to exclude emissions from the definition of disposal.101 
 
93.  BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1021 (Researchers in California found that DPM “caus[ed] 
cancer and other adverse health problems, including respiratory illnesses and increased risk of 
heart disease.”).  Id. 
94.  Id.  Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice (CCAEJ) is a 
grassroots organization in California.  See About Us, CTR. FOR CMTY. ACTION & ENVTL. 
JUST., http://ccaej.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/GR3P-WBF7].  Its overall mission is to 
address local environmental issues, particularly in areas of poverty where abuses are more 
prevalent and attract less public attention.  Id. 
95.  See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1021. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. at 1025.  This has been called the “order-of-disposal rule.”  Particulate Matter 
Emissions, supra note 30, at 1276.  Under BNSF’s holding, once a hazardous waste is 
“aerosolized” and emitted, any subsequent contamination or harm from that waste is not 
subject to a RCRA claim.  See id. at 1276–77. 
98.  BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024 (“By its terms, ‘disposal’ includes only conduct that results 
in the placement of solid waste ‘into or on any land or water.’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3)) 
(2016).  Intriguingly, when attempting to distinguish a Tenth Circuit decision that found an 
aerosolized mist of hexavalent chromium was a form of disposal under RCRA, the BNSF 
court concluded that this technically did not constitute disposal through the air, because the 
mist was sprayed directly on the land.  Id. at 1025; see United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 191 
F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999). 
99.  A release, in the context of arranger liability, occurs once the hazardous waste has 
already been disposed.  See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th 
Cir. 2006).  For the purposes of CERCLA, there must be a release, or threatened release, of 
hazardous waste in order to impose liability on a PRP.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2016). 
100.  BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024. 
101.  See id. at 1024–25 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 
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The plaintiffs argued, however, that obviating liability in this 
circumstance would run counter to congressional intent because it would 
create an inconceivable regulatory gap between RCRA and the Clean Air 
Act (CAA), through which rail yards could pollute with impunity.102  
The court demurred, and dismissed any potential regulatory gap as an 
intended exception.103  Needless to say, the BNSF claim failed because 
the plaintiffs were unable to convince the court that RCRA was a valid 
means of addressing what was, essentially, an air quality issue.104 
Intriguingly, the Pakootas plaintiffs do not challenge the BNSF 
holding, but rather contend it is inapplicable to the merits of their 
claim.105  Unlike BNSF, the Pakootas case addresses a specific parcel of 
land that suffered quantifiable harm as a result of the defendant’s 
industrial practices.106  The parties were not making an air quality claim; 
the law was not being expanded beyond its intended purpose.107  While 
this thesis might have convinced the court to rule in the plaintiffs’ favor, 
the Ninth Circuit also found other concerns that ostensibly supported 
dismissal of the claim.108 
2. Whether Emissions Constitute a Passive Migration of 
Contaminates 
Carson Harbor is a landmark Ninth Circuit case involving the 
leaching of toxic waste through soil stratifications and whether such 
passive migration constitutes disposal for the purposes of CERCLA.109  
Contamination is commonly not an acute event—for example, Teck 
Cominco contaminated the Columbia River over the course of several 
decades before any legal action was finally taken.110  While imposing 
liability on direct contamination—like dumping toxic waste into a 
 
in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”). 
102.  See id. at 1029–30. 
103.  Id. at 1026–29 (discussing legislative developments with regard to RCRA and the 
CAA). 
104.  Id. at 1029–30. 
105.  See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2016). 
106.  See id. at 978–80.  For a detailed discussion of the harm suffered, see Cawston, 
supra note 15. 
107.  See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL 
7408399, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014), rev’d, 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). 
108.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 983–86. 
109.  Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 868–70 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(en banc). 
110.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1069–72 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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river—is intuitive, when a natural environmental process spreads the 
contamination, the courts have been more reluctant to attach 
responsibility to the polluter.111 
In Carson Harbor, a mobile home park was built on land formerly 
used for petroleum production.112  During a financing reappraisal, toxic 
slag was discovered on the trailer park premises.113  The contamination 
required extensive cleanup and remediation.114  In an attempt to recoup 
their costs, the proprietor brought suit against prior owners of the land, 
alleging inter alia that they were responsible for cleanup costs under 
CERCLA.115  The court found that the claims against Unocal (the 
petroleum producer) might be cognizable under CERCLA; however, the 
plaintiff’s allegations against a general partnership—which owned the 
land after Unocal and sold it to the current tenants—presented a thornier 
legal issue.116 
The partnership’s argument was simple: it was not liable under 
CERCLA because it did not dispose of any hazardous waste during its 
ownership.117  The plaintiff posited that under CERCLA’s seemingly 
expansive definition of disposal, the partnership fit the requirements for 
a Potentially Responsible Party (PRP).  The plaintiff asserted that 
because the toxic slag continued to spread through the soil while the 
partnership owned the land, the defendant had technically committed 
disposal as defined by CERCLA.118  In weighing decisions from several 
federal jurisdictions and analyzing CERCLA’s statutory language, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that this natural permeation was not a form of 
disposal under the law.119  Otherwise, disposal could become a never-
ending process of passive proliferation that imputes liability against all 
prior landowners, regardless of the contaminant’s latency.120 
 
111.  See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 877–78; Bob’s Beverage, Inc. v. Acme, Inc., 264 
F.3d 692, 697 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding disposal requires active human conduct); ABB Indus. 
Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 358–59 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that the gradual 
spread of contaminates through the ground did not constitute disposal).  But see Nurad, Inc. v. 
William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding contaminates leaking 
out of discarded drums does constitute disposal for the purposes of CERCLA). 
112.  Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 868. 
113.  Id. at 868–69. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. at 869. 
116.  Id. 
117.  See id. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. at 875–84. 
120.  See id.  The court was also concerned that creating liability in this circumstance  
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In applying this reasoning, the Pakootas court found that aerial 
disposal of hazardous waste presented the same issue as passive soil 
migration: as a natural geological process, there was no discernable point 
at which the disposal could have stopped.121  In the court’s view, to 
extend liability in this context would implicitly disagree with a central 
tenet of Carson Harbor.122  As a three-judge panel cannot overrule an en 
banc decision, the Pakootas court was resigned to follow precedent on 
this issue.123 
II. THE PAKOOTAS COURT WAS NOT BOUND BY PRECEDENT AND 
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER CERCLA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT 
The argument section of this Note first analyzes the distinguishable 
factors between the Pakootas case and the decisions the Ninth Circuit 
cited as binding precedent.  Second, this section contends that the 
remedial purpose behind CERCLA supports a broader interpretation of 
the term “disposal.”  Finally, this section concludes by arguing that the 
legislative history and administrative enforcement of CERCLA 
buttresses the Tribes’ position that liability can be imposed on PRPs for 
causing the aerial deposition of hazardous waste. 
A. The Decisions in BNSF and Carson Harbor Are Distinguishable 
from the Pakootas Case 
The Pakootas court’s reliance on BNSF and Carson Harbor is 
misplaced because these decisions should be analyzed within their 
factual context.124  In this regard, the Pakootas court could have 
concluded that the Trail Smelter’s emissions were a form of disposal, 
without disrupting the holdings in either of the preceding cases.125  It is 
 
could potentially undermine the viability of the “innocent landowner defense.”  Id. at 883; see 
infra Section III.A.2.  Under the “innocent landowner defense,” a PRP can escape potential 
CERCLA liability provided it can show that “the release of hazardous substances was caused 
solely by ‘an act or omission of a third party.’”  Id. at 871 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6907(b)(3)). 
121.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2016). 
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Cf. Little Hocking Water Ass’n, Inc., v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 91 F. Supp. 
3d 940, 966 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (“[W]hen interpreting what constitutes land disposal of solid 
waste under RCRA, the Court should proceed on a case-by-case basis”). 
125.  See Jordan Luebkemann, Trail to Perdition: The Ninth Circuit’s “Emission” 
Omission Disposition, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 146, 166–73 (2016) (“Although the court is 
correct to note the writing on its slate, a more careful examination of the earlier precedent 
reveals that those decisions left the court with plenty of blank space in which to scribe a better  
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evident from the Pakootas opinion and the court’s comments during oral 
argument126 that the Ninth Circuit felt constrained by BNSF’s order of 
disposal rule.127  However, the Pakootas court should have noted that the 
plaintiffs in BNSF only brought suit under RCRA because the CAA was 
inapplicable to rail yards.128  The parties were not claiming that DPM 
was contaminating a specific parcel of land or body of water.129  Rather, 
they were arguing that DPM was emitted from rail yards and directly 
inhaled by the general populace.130  This is technically an air quality 
claim within the purview of the CAA.131  Consequently, the Ninth 
Circuit was understandably reluctant to recognize an unintended 
legislative overlap between RCRA and the CAA.132 
Conversely, the plaintiffs’ claim in Pakootas fits squarely within the 
provisions of CERCLA.133  The salient fact in reaching this 
determination is that the plaintiffs seek remediation of the environment, 
specifically the soil and water within the UCR site.134  This is distinct 
from the claims presented in BNSF, which focused on the human health 
risks associated with inhaling ambient DPM.135  It would seem that 
BNSF should only apply when the basis of the claim is the “emission” of 
hazardous waste.136  However, if the emitted waste has been introduced 
into the physical environment, and the “deposition” is the basis of the 
 
opinion.”). 
126.  Oral Argument at 12:12–13:27, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 
975 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35228), www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=
0000009390.  Judge Callahan notes that the BNSF court did not need to establish the order of 
disposal rule, nevertheless the case does require physical placement of hazardous waste onto 
land or water in order to constitute disposal.  Id. at 12:12–13:50; see infra Section III.A.1.  
The court questioned counsel on whether a contrary ruling in Pakootas would require the 
panel to classify the order of disposal rule as a statement of dicta.  Oral Argument at 11:13–
11:40, Pakootas, 830 F.3d 975 (No. 15-35228). 
127.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2016). 
128.  See Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1022 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. at 1021. 
131.  Id. at 1021–22.  However, locomotives are “indirect sources” of pollution under 
the CAA and not subject to federal regulation.  Id. at 1027. 
132.  See id. at 1030 (finding that the omission of DPM from the CAA “[was] the 
product of a careful and reasoned decision made by Congress”). 
133.  See Brief for the United Sates, as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 8–10, 
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35228). 
134.  See Response Brief for the Appellee State of Washington at 8–10, Pakootas v. 
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35228). 
135.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 133, at 12–16. 
136.  See id. at 14–15. 
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claim, then the BNSF rule should be inconsequential.137 
1. The BNSF Court’s “Order of Disposal” Statement Is Not a 
Bright-Line Rule 
The vast majority of arguments presented in Pakootas138 focused on 
a single statement in the BNSF opinion: “[w]e therefore conclude that 
‘disposal’ occurs where the solid waste is first placed ‘into or on any 
land or water’ and is thereafter ‘emitted into the air.’”139  Teck’s 
argument was that regardless of this statement’s logic, it nevertheless 
creates a rule that emissions are not a form of disposal under 
CERCLA.140  The Tribes argued that the rule in BNSF should be 
interpreted as only addressing the ambient aspect of contamination; it 
was not intended to address contamination that causes harm to the 
physical environment.141 
Teck’s argument interprets the “order of disposal” rule as presenting 
a two-stage requirement for disposal: the hazardous waste must first be 
placed “into or on any land or water,” then “emitted into the air.”142  
However, Teck fails to explain how this rule operates for land 
contaminated by subsequent emissions.  If aerial pathway claims have no 
merit according to BNSF, then the second stage in this rule is not just 
superfluous, it is wrong.143  To follow this argument to its logical end, if 
the subsequently emitted waste travels onto a neighboring parcel, the 
contamination would not constitute “disposal” because the hazardous 
waste was not directly placed on the locus in quo.144 
Alternatively, if the BNSF statement is read as addressing only the 
aerial aspect of the contamination, the subsequent emissions requirement 
does not undermine the rule.  In examining this concept further, it is 
helpful to view it within BNSF’s factual context.  In BNSF, the plaintiffs 
 
137.  See Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1024 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
138.  See Response Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134, at 20–24; Brief for the 
United States, supra note 133, at 18–20; Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 1:24–10:45. 
139.  BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024. 
140.  See Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 0:30–10:31; Particulate Matter Emissions, 
supra note 30, at 1272. 
141.  See Response Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134, at 20–24; see also Pakootas 
v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, at *2 (E.D. Wash. 
Dec. 31, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that disposal 
should be examined in the context of the “facility” that it contaminates). 
142.  See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024; Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 1:24–1:45. 
143.  See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024. 
144.  See id. 
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claimed that the defendant’s disposal was a three-stage process: (1) the 
DPM was emitted from rail yards; (2) it fell to the ground; and (3) the 
DPM was, subsequently, swept up by wind and air currents and inhaled 
by humans.145  To succeed in their RCRA claim, the BNSF plaintiffs 
were required to show that the defendant’s disposal “present[ed] ‘an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment.’”146  RCRA defines disposal as: “the discharge, deposit, 
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or 
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or 
hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment 
or be emitted into the air.”147  In BNSF, the “imminent and substantial 
endangerment” was not the affect rail yard emissions had on the 
environment, but rather the inhalation of ambient DPM.148  By its very 
nature, such a claim is not consistent with the overall purpose of RCRA, 
which is meant to address disposal and storage of hazardous waste.149 
The Pakootas claim escapes this pitfall because it seeks remediation 
of the UCR site—the medium of transport should be inconsequential to 
the merits of the case.150  The court is not examining whether 
“emissions” constitute disposal, but whether “deposition” of hazardous 
waste falls within CERCLA’s definition.  As advocated by the plaintiffs, 
the Ninth Circuit should have examined the factual underpinnings of the 
BNSF decision.  In so doing, the court may have found that the issues 
 
145.  Id. at 1020–21. 
146.  Id. at 1020 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2018)). 
147.  42 U.S.C. § 6903 (2016) (emphasis added). 
148.  BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1020–21. 
149.  APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 81. 
150.  See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024; Little Hocking Water Ass’n, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont 
Nemours & Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d 940, 966 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (finding that RCRA could be 
invoked to address aerial deposition of particulate matter when it causes soil and groundwater 
contamination).  In Little Hocking, the court declined to follow a narrow reading of RCRA 
that would require a two-stage order of disposal; “solid C8 particles are emitted into the air, 
fall onto the ground, remain there, and then contaminate the soil and groundwater . . . this type 
of soil and groundwater contamination is precisely the type of harm RCRA aims to 
remediate.”  Id. at 965; cf. Citizens Against Pollution v. Ohio Power Co., No. C2-04-CV-371, 
2006 WL 6870564, at *4–5 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2006) (finding that flue gas emissions could 
be considered disposal under RCRA because there was evidence that the flue gas came into 
physical contact with the ground).  Curiously, the BNSF opinion also states (without 
articulation) that the holding in United States v. Power Eng’g Co. is not contradictory to the 
Ninth Circuit’s order of disposal rule.  BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1025; see United States v. Power 
Eng’g Co., 191 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the aerial spraying of 
hexavalent chromium was disposal for the purposes of RCRA).  Perhaps, the court found it 
inapposite because there was “demonstrable contact” with the environment.  See Response 
Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134, at 20–24; Luebkemann, supra note 125, at 164. 
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between the cases, while conceptually similar, were markedly 
incomparable.151  In adopting the defendant’s argument, the court 
declined to issue a more nuanced explication of the “order of disposal” 
rule152—one that reconciled the logical inconsistencies of BNSF when 
applied to cases like Pakootas. 
2. Aerial Deposition of Hazardous Waste Is Consistent with 
Carson Harbor’s Definition of Disposal 
Even if the Pakootas plaintiffs had convinced the court to find the 
BNSF decision inapposite, the Carson Harbor case presented an 
additional hurdle.  The court’s opinion makes it clear that it was 
concerned that if CERCLA liability was determined to include the aerial 
deposition of hazardous waste, disposal “would be a never-ending 
process”—a concept inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 
Carson Harbor.153  However, the court’s conclusion is misguided 
because the Carson Harbor decision chiefly focused on limiting disposal 
to those modes that are provided within CERCLA’s definition (e.g., 
discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, etc.).154  Thus, 
this explains the finding in Carson Harbor that the passive migration of 
contaminates through subsurface soil was not disposal because such 
“movement” was more aptly described as “‘seeping,’ ‘oozing,’ and 
possibly ‘leaching.’”155  None of those terms are found in CERCLA’s 
definition of disposal; consequently, the passive movement of 
contaminates was not considered disposal pursuant to the statute’s 
language.156 
Conversely, “depositing” is a form of disposal according to 
CERCLA.157  Furthermore, for decades, the term “depositing” has been 
 
151.  See Frank Cioffi, Filling Holes in the Air: Why the Ninth Circuit in Pakootas v. 
Teck Cominco Should Decline to Open up a New Hole in Coverage That Would Circumvent 
CERCLA Arranger Liability for Sites Contaminated by Aerial Emissions, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 28, 58–62 (2016) (arguing that the plaintiffs’ goal in BNSF was to “enjoin the 
defendant’s pollution of the ambient air” and that the Pakootas case is factually dissimilar). 
152.  See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024. 
153.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2016); see 
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(finding that passive migration is a never ending geological process and it would be contrary 
to CERCLA’s statutory language to extend liability in this regard). 
154.  See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 882–83; see also 42 
U.S.C. § 6903 (2016). 
155.  See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 879. 
156.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6903. 
157.  Id. 
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synonymous with the aerial transfer of hazardous chemicals—“dry acid 
deposition” or “dry deposition” is the means by which emitted waste 
particles and particulate matter “precursors” come to be located in the 
natural environment.158  Moreover, the innocent landowner issue that 
influenced the Carson Harbor court should not be implicated in cases 
involving the aerial deposition of hazardous waste.  With this concern 
addressed, there is no policy basis that vitiates the merits of the Pakootas 
claim.159  Ultimately, the central tenet of Carson Harbor is not whether 
an indeterminate geological process can constitute disposal, but whether 
the process is consistent with the plain meaning of “disposal,” or any of 
its provided terms.160 
B. CERCLA Was Intended to Address the Aerial Deposition of 
Hazardous Waste 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that CERCLA’s legislative history was 
unavailing in the Pakootas case “because Congress did not appear to 
consider a fact pattern like this one.”161  Although the court 
acknowledged that Congress did discuss emissions during the bill’s 
passage, it was unclear if these statements were addressing the issue of 
disposal.162  The court implicitly concedes, however, that if the 
legislative history was clear it would be considered, especially given the 
ambiguities in the statute’s language.163 
Courts often deride CERCLA for being an abomination of linguistic 
construction.164  In part, the blame falls upon the final draft that was the 
 
158.  See CAN.–U.S. AIR QUALITY COMM., CANADA–UNITED STATES 
TRANSBOUNDARY PARTICULATE MATTER SCIENCE ASSESSMENT 4–7 (Dec. 2004), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/canada-
u.s._transboundary_pm_science_assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS88-MAZJ]; see also 
Stevens, supra note 43. 
159.  Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 878–80; see Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 
28:29–28:50. 
160.  Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 887. 
161.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2016). 
162.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985.  CERCLA’s definition of release includes the term 
“emitting.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2016).  As mentioned above, one of the requirements for 
prevailing in a private action under CERCLA liability is to demonstrate that a hazardous 
substance has been “released,” from the contaminated site.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 981.  The 
definition of release is broader than the definition of disposal.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601, 
with 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (2016). 
163.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985 (citing Tides v. Boeing Co., 644 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 
2011)). 
164.  See United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005) (“It 
has become de rigueur to criticize CERCLA as a hastily passed statute that is far from a 
paragon of legislative clarity.”); Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 883 (“Clearly, neither a logician  
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result of last minute revisions and concessions, which were made on the 
House and Senate floors.165  In the end, the final draft bore almost no 
resemblance to previous versions of the bill.166  Despite this problem, 
most courts still acknowledge the fundamental intentions of the law: (1) 
provide a prompt and effective response to environmental calamities; 
and (2) shift the burden of cleanup costs to the responsible parties.167 
The Tribes stressed CERCLA’s broad and remedial purpose in 
framing their argument, but the Ninth Circuit found this contention 
insipid.168  While some courts are willing to interpret CERCLA’s 
provisions liberally, the Ninth Circuit has been historically reluctant to 
follow this model.169  It would seem that more concrete legislative 
history—beyond conclusory platitudes—is necessary to impart an 
expansion of CERCLA liability in this jurisdiction.170 
Although CERCLA’s direct legislative history is sparse, 
foundational elements of the law can be found in House and Senate bills 
that were never passed.171  Some of these bills were incorporated into 
CERCLA’s final draft, for example Senate bill 1480,172 which 
introduced many of the cleanup and financing provisions that are 
synonymous with CERCLA today.173  The legislative history of this bill 
 
nor a grammarian will find comfort in the world of CERCLA. . . .  Transported to 
Washington, D.C. in 1980 or 1986, armed with a red pen and a copy of Strunk & White’s 
Elements of Style, we might offer a few clarifying suggestions.”). 
165.  TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 73; see also United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 
619 F. Supp. 162, 204 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (“[A] hastily assembled bill and a fragmented 
legislative history add to the usual difficulty of discerning the full meaning of the law.”).  The 
compromised law was passed under a suspension of the rules that prohibited subsequent 
amendments.  TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 73.  Consequently, “there are no committee or 
conference reports addressing the version of the legislation that ultimately became law.”  Id. at 
4. 
166.  Compare Hazardous Waste Contamination Act of 1980, H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. 
(1980), with The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat., 2767 (1980). 
167.  TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 73; see, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 599, 599 (2009). 
168.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985. 
169.  See, e.g., Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(en banc) (finding that CERCLA’s definition of disposal does not encompass the passive 
migration of contaminates through the soil).  But see Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 
452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that Teck Cominco “arranged for disposal” even 
though it did not contract with a third-party). 
170.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985. 
171.  SWITZER & GRAY, supra note 71, at 5–8. 
172.  See Environmental Emergency Response Act, S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1979). 
173.  See SWITZER & GRAY, supra note 71, at 5–8. 
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has been helpful in discerning the drafters’ intent for some of 
CERCLA’s more intricate issues.174 
1. History of the El Paso Smelter 
Within the legislative history for Senate bill 1480 is a report from 
the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee, which 
delineates some of the underlying congressional concerns that led to the 
bill’s creation.175  The Committee Report references a research study that 
examined six cases of environmental contamination.176  The study, 
conducted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), concluded that 
victims in these six cases were undercompensated for their injuries—in 
part, due to the lack of legal remedies available.177 
One of the cases examined in the CRS Report involved a smelter in 
El Paso, Texas.178  The smelter operator employed a significant number 
of migrant workers, some of whom lived in a nearby community that 
was colloquially called “Smeltertown.”179  It was a squalid 
neighborhood; it lacked running water, electricity, and basic social 
 
174.  See, e.g., Ninth Ave. Remedial Grp. v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651, 664 
(N.D. Ind. 1996) (finding that the legislative history of S. 1480 supported the argument that 
CERCLA was intended to be applied retroactively). 
175.  S. REP. NO. 96-848 (1980). 
176.  Id. at 13–14. 
177.  Id.  The CRS Report reached three basic conclusions: (1) the common law is 
generally not conducive to prevailing on toxic tort claims; (2) proving injuries from pollution 
and contamination is difficult and expensive; and, consequently, (3) the compensation 
afforded to victims is incommensurate with their damages.  Id.; see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
SER. NO. 93-13, SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: 
ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS, (1980) 
[hereinafter SIX CASE STUDIES]. 
178.  SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 51.  Founded in 1887, the smelter 
specialized in copper, lead, and zinc.  Id. at 51.  In 2008, the smelter operator ASARCO 
entered into a landmark bankruptcy settlement, which required it to pay fifty-two million in 
cleanup costs pursuant to its liabilities under CERCLA and RCRA.  In re ASARCO LLC, No. 
05-21207, 2009 WL 8176865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 21, 2009).  The contamination from the 
El Paso smelter presents an analogous transboundary pollution issue to the Trail Smelter 
problem.  See infra Section III.B.2; John Burnett, A Toxic Century: Mining Giant Must Clean 
Up Mess, NPR (Feb. 4, 2010, 12:50 AM) https://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=122779177 (“It is very clear that a majority of what came out of that flue 
and was deposited over 100 years landed in Mexico.”); El Paso Smelter Still Poses Lead-
Poisoning Peril to Children in Juarez, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 1977), http://www.nytimes.com/
1977/11/28/archives/el-paso-smelter-still-poses-leadpoisoning-peril-to-children-in.html 
(Mexican health authorities concluded that approximately 8000 children, living within a half-
mile of the El Paso smelter, were suffering the effects of lead pollution). 
179.  The community housed roughly 120 Chicano families.  SIX CASE STUDIES, supra 
note 177, at 51. 
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services.180  Situated in the smelter’s shadow, residents would watch as 
toxic slag poured into a molten pile right beside their homes.181 
Many children living in Smeltertown were found to have elevated 
levels of lead in their blood.182  In 1972, thirty-five children were 
hospitalized due to lead poisoning.183  Shortly thereafter, health officials 
evicted Smeltertown’s residents and relocated the families across the 
city.184  Environmental investigations found disturbing levels of toxic 
metals throughout the area.185  Given the scope and scale of the 
dispersion, investigators agreed that the smelter’s emissions were the 
primary source of the contamination.186 
Despite knowledge of the contamination, ASARCO, the smelter 
operator, did not warn residents in Smeltertown.187  Consequently, for 
more than seven years, ASARCO silently observed as residents inhaled 
and ingested toxic levels of lead on a daily basis.188  In 1972, the city of 
El Paso brought a lawsuit against the smelter operator under state 
environmental laws.189  The parties settled and ASARCO agreed to 
implement new pollution control measures over a period of several 
years.190  Many of the private lawsuits that followed also settled but, due 
to evidentiary difficulties, most parties were undercompensated for their 
damages.191 
 
180.  See SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 406 (describing the town as 
“substandard housing, dusty unpaved roads, chipped and peeling paint; in close proximity to a 
major highway”). 
181.  Id. 
182.  Philip J. Landrigan et al., Epidemic Lead Absorption Near an Ore Smelter: The 
Role of Particulate Lead, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 123, 128–29 (1975).  Among children 
studied, roughly forty-three percent had abnormal lead absorption levels; environmental 
particulate lead was determined to be the leading cause of exposure.  Id.  “[T]he more mobile 
fractions of environmental particulate lead—that is, the lead in dust and air—were those most 
closely associated with human uptake.”  Id.  Although there are recognized thresholds for 
determining a potentially toxic level of lead, most researchers agree there is no safe level for 
lead.  Kate J. Darby, Lead Astray: Scale, Environmental Justice and the El Paso Smelter, 17 
LOC. ENVTL. 797, 798–99 (2012). 
183.  SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 406. 
184.  Id. at 51.  Prior to the relocation of the Smeltertown families, ASARCO sprayed 
plastic chemicals on the ground to keep dust levels down.  Id. at 418. 
185.  Landrigan et al., supra note 182, at 123–25. 
186.  SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 417–18; Landrigan, supra note 182, at 129. 
187.  ASARCO did warn local ranchers, however, that the area was unsafe for cattle 
grazing.  SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 417–18. 
188.  Id. at 420–22. 
189.  Id. at 422–24. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Texas law requires “more than a suspicion that such health effects will occur.”  Id.  
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2. The El Paso Smelter is Part of CERCLA’s Past and Present 
While it is unclear how influential this report was in the final 
version of CERCLA, its existence alone contradicts the Pakootas court’s 
contention that “Congress did not appear to consider a fact pattern like 
this one.”192  The similarities are uncanny, even to the point that the CRS 
Report references the Trail Smelter during its discussion of the El Paso 
incident.193  Moreover, the focus of the CRS Report was on the smelter’s 
emissions.194  Although there was some discussion that hazardous waste 
was released from the smelter’s facility though other pathways, the 
particulate matter primarily escaped in the form of emissions.195  
Therefore, if we infer from the CRS Report that Congress intended to 
address environmental disasters like Smeltertown, then it is reasonable to 
conclude that the legislative history supports the argument that aerial 
deposition of particulate matter was intended to constitute disposal under 
 
at 449.  Most diseases have multiple causes; therefore, the latent health risks associated with 
lead poisoning typically are established through epidemiological studies.  See CARL F. 
CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 38 (2006).  To this 
end, litigants can show that compared to the general population, the individuals in the exposed 
cohort were at an elevated risk for the chronic conditions attributed to lead poisoning.  See id.  
However, there are pragmatic difficulties in obtaining helpful epidemiological studies.  Id. at 
155–56; see also Cancer Clusters: The Hunt for a Killer, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2017, 9:57 
AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cancer-clusters-the-hunt-for-a-killer/ [https://perma.cc/
X3HN-5FGT] (noting that the occurrence of rare cancers in an isolated geographic area (i.e. 
“cancer clusters”) often times cannot be directly linked to any environmental contamination). 
192.  See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2016).  It 
should be acknowledged that Senate bill 1480 originally contained a personal injury provision, 
which was not included in the final version of the law.  See Grad, supra note 70, at 19.  It 
could be argued that the CRS report was directly aimed at supporting this omitted provision 
and, thus, it should be given less legal weight.  See SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ix 
(Helen Cohn Needham & Mark Menefee, eds., 1982) (“[E]xplanations of a bill that did not 
pass the Congress are generally less important than explanations of a bill that did pass.”).  But 
cf. 126 CONG. REC. 30,943 (1980) (statement of Rep. Heinz) (arguing that the El Paso Smelter 
incident was, in part, the basis for imposing a fee on zinc smelters). 
[The] EPA document, ‘Fees on Zinc’ . . . has been cited as justification for 
imposing Superfund fees on zinc. . . .  [I]ncriminating zinc in connection with the 
El Paso smelter is intentionally misleading.  It has never been suggested that zinc 
emissions from that smelter have caused any adverse human health effects and the 
effects which were noted have been subsequently discredited by reputable 
scientists.  In addition, the smelting of zinc has not been shown to cause the 
release of hazardous quantities of other pollutants. 
Id. 
193.  SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 449 (“Similar damage to cattle and horses 
was reported near a lead smelter in Trail, British Columbia.”). 
194.  Id. at 407. 
195.  Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 7 (1980) (discussing environmental disasters 
that precipitate the drafting of S. 1480) (“The careless manufacturing and disposal practices 
also resulted in atmospheric emissions which settled on surface soils.”). 
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CERCLA. 
Unsurprisingly, despite “onerous” environmental regulations, the El 
Paso Smelter continued to pollute the surrounding area for many more 
years.196  Finally, in July of 2002, the EPA sent a Notice of Potential 
Liability to ASARCO, which informed the company that it was 
potentially liable under CERCLA for numerous contaminated sites 
throughout the city.197  While initial negotiations were unproductive, 
ASARCO eventually agreed to pay more than fifty million dollars in 
cleanup costs.198  However, since its liability under CERCLA and RCRA 
was largely predicated on the aerial deposition of particulate matter, a 
similar settlement agreement might have been unlikely had the 
contamination occurred in the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction.199  
Accordingly, not only is the El Paso Smelter case indicative of the issues 
that CERCLA was intended to address, it also demonstrates CERCLA’s 
effectiveness when the law is broadly applied. 
C. EPA Decisions Should Be Given Skidmore Deference 
In a letter of supplemental authority, the United States argued to the 
Pakootas court that the EPA “has for decades used CERCLA to respond 
to contamination from the aerial deposition of hazardous substances.”200  
The plaintiffs posited that these administrative documents might be 
entitled to Skidmore deference.201  The Ninth Circuit declined to address 
 
196.  U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, EL PASO AND DONA ANA COUNTY METALS 
SURVEY SAMPLING REPORT (Aug. 17, 2001), https://d32ogoqmya1dw8.cloudfront.net/files/
integrate/teaching_materials/map_sense/el_paso_dona_ana.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MMZ-
9D2A].  The report prepared for the EPA found elevated levels of arsenic and lead in locations 
throughout El Paso, including parks, schools, and college campuses.  Id.  The report also 
found levels of arsenic and lead more than two orders of magnitude greater than permitted 
threshold levels.  Letter from Myron O. Knudson, P.E., Dir. Superfund Div., to ASARCO Inc. 
(Jul. 16, 2002) (on file with EPA). 
197.  Knudson, supra note 196. 
198.  In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2009 WL 8176865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 
21, 2009). 
199.  See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2016).  If 
ASARCO had wanted to challenge the EPA’s determination that it was a PRP, its strongest 
argument would be a definitional defense based on whether it “disposed” of any hazardous 
waste.  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2016). 
200.  Letter of Supplemental Authority at 1, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 
830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35228).  See, e.g., In re Gulf Res. & Chem. Corp. & 
Hecla Mining Co., EPA1090-10-01-106, 1990 WL 10532643, at *1 (E.P.A. Oct. 1, 1990). 
201.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 220 (2001) (“Chevron did not 
eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference 
whatever its form, given the ‘specialized experience and broader investigations and 
information’ available to the agency.”) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139  
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this argument in its opinion because the issue was not fully briefed 
during oral argument.202  However, assuming future litigants present this 
argument in a timely manner, courts should be receptive to its merits. 
The EPA has been responsible for administering and enforcing 
CERCLA since the law was enacted.203  This familiarity with the 
intricacies and practicalities of the law should warrant some deference 
from the courts.204  The Supreme Court first articulated this concept in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., which addressed whether an agency’s 
interpretation of a provision within the Fair Labor Standards Act should 
warrant any consideration from the courts.205  The Court found that 
based on the agency’s “body of experience and informed judgment,” its 
opinions, while not controlling, were a proper source of guidance.206  
Since Skidmore was decided, courts have deferred to agency 
determinations promulgated in letters, settlement agreements, unilateral 
orders, and various other legal memoranda.207  It is worth noting, 
however, that Skidmore deference is only persuasive and, unlike 
Chevron deference (normally afforded to agency promulgated 
regulations),208 does not require the court to deviate from prior judicial 
interpretation.209 
Therefore, when it comes to the issue of defining “disposal” under 
CERCLA, courts should be willing to consider the EPA’s historical 
 
(1944)). 
202.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 986 n.12 (“Arguments raised for the first time in 28(j) 
letters are ordinarily considered waived. . . .  We decline to reach such a complex issue on less 
than full briefing.”). 
203.  See generally Executive Order No. 12580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2921, FR 2923 (Jan. 23, 
1987). 
204.  See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 218; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
205.  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
206.  See id. 
207.  See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 235–39 (finding that a “ruling letter” regarding a 
customs classification was due deference dependent on its “thoroughness, logic and 
expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight”); Alaska Oil & 
Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671, 681–82 (9th Cir. 2016) (affording Skidmore deference to 
an internal memoranda regarding the endangered species list), cert. denied, No. 17-133, 2018 
WL 491542, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2018); Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 799 
F.3d 468, 479 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part sub nom. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity 
Brands, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016) (“Copyright Office’s determination that design is 
protectable under the Copyright Act is entitled to Skidmore deference.”); cf. Siwe v. Holder, 
742 F.3d 603, 607 (5th Cir. 2014) (reviewing one-member Board of Immigration (BIA) 
decisions under the Skidmore deference standard). 
208.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864–66 
(1984).  Neither side in Pakootas argued that Chevron deference applied.  Pakootas v. Teck 
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 986 n.12 (9th Cir. 2016). 
209.  Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 986. 
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application of the law.210  For example, the EPA’s letter to ASARCO 
stated that the company was a PRP under CERCLA, impliedly because it 
emitted hazardous waste, which was subsequently deposited throughout 
the city.211  However, this is far from the only example of the EPA 
applying CERCLA in cases that involved emissions of hazardous 
waste.212 
In a letter of supplemental authority, counsel for the United States 
cited three instances where the EPA had determined that emissions were 
a form of disposal under CERCLA.213  For example, In re Gulf 
Resources, years of mining and smelting had caused significant 
contamination in the Silver Valley of Idaho.214  The location was placed 
on the NPL and identified as the Bunker Hill Mining and Metallurgical 
Site.215  The respondent companies entered an agreement with the EPA 
to initiate remedial action in the area.216  The agreement specifically 
stated that the “respondents and their predecessors in interest have 
released large quantities of a variety of waste products, including 
airborne emissions.”217  Other cases include In re ACM Smelter & 
Refinery Site218 and In re Anniston Lead Site, & Anniston PCB Site.219  In 
both locations, the EPA concluded that aerial deposition of hazardous 
waste was a significant contamination pathway, and that CERCLA 
liability could be imposed on the respondents based on this activity.220 
 
210.  See Letter of Supplemental Authority, supra note 200; Oral Argument, supra note 
126, at 22:05–22:16 (“There have been thirty years of CERCLA practice of addressing smelter 
sites, refineries . . . hundreds of sites across the country where allegations are based on the 
aerial deposition of hazardous substance.”). 
211.  Knudson, supra note 196. 
212.  See, e.g., In re Gulf Res. & Chem. Corp. & Hecla Mining Co., No.1090-10-01-
106, 1990 WL 10532643, at *1 (E.P.A. Oct. 1, 1990). 
213.  Letter of Supplemental Authority, supra note 200. 
214.  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 10, MINE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR 
THE BUNKER HILL MINE KELLOGG, IDAHO, 2-1–2-2 (1999), https://www3.epa.gov/region10/
pdf/sites/bunker_hill/cda_basin/bunker_hill_mine_contigency_plan.pdf. 
215.  Id. 
216.  See generally In re Gulf Res., 1990 WL 10532643, at *7. 
217.  Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
218.  CERCLA-04-2005-3777, (E.P.A. Jul. 27, 2005), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2014-03/documents/anniston_pcb_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYY5-XKWD]. 
219.  CERCLA-08-2011-0017, (E.P.A. Sept. 8, 2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/OA/
RHC/EPAAdmin.nsf/Filings/734256DA6DAC2D5385257907001B7F19/$File/CERCLA0820
110017%20AO.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EUG-LWHT]. 
220.  In re Anniston Lead Site, & Anniston PCB Site, CERCLA-08-2011-0017, (E.P.A. 
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Given the breadth and thoroughness of these administrative orders, 
courts should be willing to defer to the EPA’s interpretation of 
disposal.221  While this deference might not be dispositive, it is important 
that courts at least consider the EPA’s opinions.222  Although any 
decision must be sound in legal precedent, pragmatism should have its 
day in court as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent Ninth Circuit holding in Pakootas dramatically curtails 
the scope of CERCLA liability.  It is a ruling that is inconsistent with 
CERCLA’s broad remedial purpose, legislative history, administrative 
enforcement, and interpretation.  The court erroneously concluded that it 
was bound by prior precedent because it failed to consider the factual 
context of BNSF and the distinguishable issues that the Pakootas case 
presented.  Future litigants in other jurisdictions should be swift to argue 
that the aerial deposition of hazardous waste fits squarely within the 
definition of disposal under CERCLA.  Otherwise, polluters like Teck 
Cominco will continue to escape responsibility for their environmental 
contamination through linguistic contortion. 
 
anniston_pcb_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYY5-XKWD] (“Millions of pounds of PCBs were 
released from the plant through disposal of . . . [polychlorinated biphenyl] through air and 
fugitive emissions.”); In re ACM Smelter & Refinery Site, CERCLA-04-2005-3777, (E.P.A. 
Jul. 27, 2005), http://yosemite.epa.gov/OA/RHC/EPAAdmin.nsf/Filings/
734256DA6DAC2D5385257907001B7F19/$File/CERCLA0820110017%20AO.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7EUG-LWHT] (“Contaminant transport to the community of Black Eagle 
occurred via several pathways, including primarily airborne particulate contamination from 
the smelter stack, which settled on neighborhood soils, buildings and other surfaces.”). 
221.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J. dissenting) 
(“The majority’s approach . . . sets forth a sliding scale of deference . . . dependent ‘upon the 
thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
222.  See Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233, 1243 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding the 
EPA’s characterization of a CERCLA action as either removal or remedial under CERCLA 
was entitled to Skidmore deference). 
